Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
Honors Theses

University Honors Program

8-1999

Lessons Learned About Education and Training
From Select Socrates Dialogues
Tabitha M. Barsky
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses
Recommended Citation
Barsky, Tabitha M., "Lessons Learned About Education and Training From Select Socrates Dialogues" (1999). Honors Theses. Paper
133.

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

Southern Illinois University

Lessons Learned About Education and Training
From Select Socrates Dialogues

Honors Thesis UHON-49/
Tabitha M Barsky
Wednesday, August 04, /999

CONTENTS

I.

ABSTRACf

1

II. INTRODUCfION

1

III. DISCUSSION

3

.:. MENO

3

.:. ION

9

.:. PHAEDRUS

12

.:.

<='R~O

115

.:. GORGIAS.

19

IV. CONCLUSION

23

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY

25

Abstract
I

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote, "Men ofgenius are often dull and inert in society;
as the blazing meteor, when it descends to earth. is only a stone." This thought
correlates to the well quoted phrase, "Looks can be deceiving." This idea is one which
applies to many disciplines. Pertaining to this essay it demonstrates to us that the stone,
although old and discarded, can possibly represent something much greater than is seen.
When applied to philosophy, words that are old, silting dead on a page, may prove
astounding when reexamined.

2

The Socrates dialogues by Plato, can certainly be seen by some to represent this stone of
old, dead, and unused wisdom. In this thesis it will be attempted to find something
special; an ideology ofwhat good education is. As well as, what lessons can be learned
from this blazing meteor, who's works have since become old. This will be done by
examining excerpt's from Plato's dialogues, Meno, Jon, Gorgias, Crito, and Phaedrus,
that explain a central theme, and then explaining it in terms oflessons to be learnedfor
application to education.

Introduction

3

The foundations of education and training come from many highly advanced
older civilizations, many that have since died out. From these civilizations we can learn
from their laws on how business and govermnent were conducted. From the arts of these
civilizations we can understand more about their way of life and from their philosophies
we can learn about their beliefs and ideas concerning many different subjects.

4

From the Greeks we can learn about their ideas onjustice, beauty, knowledge, and
immortality. What's more, we can ascertain how the ideas ofjust a few men appear to
have determined how the whole Hellenic empire thought. In particular, were the
catalytic ideas about education, and training, that continue to be influential today. These
ideas will be examined from five of the Socrates dialogues, that are about knowledge,
instruction and education in order to determine the principle lessons to be learned and
how these principles can be applied to today's society.

5

The Socratic dialogues appear to have particular relevance to education and training
because of the nature in which Plato investigates pure ideas and the study of the reality of
those Ideas in a systematic and applied way. Plato demonstrates, in these dialogues, that
we need not understand an idea to appreciate it. This is established by the way in which
Socrates investigates, with uncertainty, the fundamental principles held in high esteem by
the Hellenic Empire. This is done not because he knows the meaning of what he is
questioning, but because he appreciates the value of finding an answer.

6

Plato seems to want to convey that education is based on learning which is drawn out of a
pupil, not taught to him. This education is thought to be instilled or inspired by divine
inspiration. This basic principle of Platonian thought can be further applied with the
idea that there are no educators only education (Jowett, 1937). For example, a central
idea from the dialogues of Meno and Ion, is that information is existent in a pupil as in
an orator and he can miraculously understand, discuss and relate what he already knows
merely on motivation.

m
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7

This inspiration is coupled in the Socrates dialogues with virtue. These two distinct
qualities are greatly admired by Socrates and consequently his pupil, Plato. The linking
of inspirational thought and virtue appear to stem from Socrates. Where the notion of
knowledge being an aspect of virtue, appears to be an idea worked into the dialogues by
Plato. The intermingling of ideas appears several times though out the dialogues
(Freeman, 1956). In many circumstances it is difficult to extract the true intent of the
author and that of his mentor Socrates. Knowing this, it must be acknowledged that the
author of this thesis does not know the true purpose ofthese dialogues as intended when
original discussed, and this thesis is only an attempt to make an educated guess at their
real meanings.

8

Clearly Socrates says, Education is necessary for the survival of man. In it's staple form
it is needed to gather and prepare food, to find and build shelter, and it is essential to
maintain vitality. In the search for an absolutism of truth, wisdom and knowledge we are
introduced to the idea of gaining education of these absolutes for merely the sake of
gaining knowledge by itself In other words, to Jearn of new ideas, or skills not for the
basis of being paid, or to learn a trade alone, but clearly to learn for the sake oflearning
(Roderick, 1990).

Discussion

Meno
9

Of the Socratic essentials, is virtue an aspect of a mans education; can virtue be taught
and is virtue a necessity required to learn? Put another way, Meno says as quoted from
the dialogue named for him, "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by
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teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to
a man by nature, or in what other way (70a),(Thomas, 1980)?"

I0

In discussing this quote, it first seem essential to define virtue. In this dialogue Socrates
attempts to capture the essence of education and acquired virtues by defining in
definitive terms what virtue is. This proves to be a difficult task, and results in the
presentation of many examples of aspects of virtue, rather than what virtue is as a whole.
It is this idea of virtue being more then the sum of its parts that Socrates wishes to
emphasize.

II

As the dialogue continues to develop, it is agreed upon by Menon and Socrates that virtue
must be good. Additionally, virtue is wisdom and/or true opinion. This is illustrated in
paragraph 89a., Socrates' is speaking and concludes that virtue is wisdom, whether in
whole or in part. In addition, it is agreed upon in paragraph 9Th., that virtue is also right
opinion since it is just as good a guide to right action as wisdom (Thomas, 1980).

12

On the topic of whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or whether it comes
to a man by nature, or in some other way, Socrates suggests that virtue is a product of
divine transpiration. This is demonstrated in Socrates' closing comments to Menon, he
defines virtue as follows: " ...Virtue is seen as coming neither by nature nor by teaching:
but by divine allotment incomprehensibly to those to whom it comes - unless there were
some politician so outstanding as to be able to make another man a politician. And if
there were one, he might almost be said to be among the living such as Homer says of
Teiresias... whom Homer says that he alone of those in Hades has his mind, the others are
flittering shades (This is a passage from Odyssey, X. 494, Translated by Rouse). Then

~
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from this our reasoning, Menon, virtue is shown as coming to us, whenever it comes, by
divine dispensation." Socrates further comments that, "We shall only know the truth
about this clearly when, before inquiring in what way virtue comes to mankind, we first
try to search out what virtue is in itself (67 - 68)."

13

A second translation of this passage by B. Jowett (1937), is offered to give more insight
as to what virtue is considered to be by Socrates: "To sum up our inquiry-the result seems
to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an
instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless
there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating
statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what
Homer says that Tireasias was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest
are flitting shades;' and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among
shadows...Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of
God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given,
we inquire into the actual nature ofvirtue (100)."

14

By suggesting that virtue comes from divine dispensation, Socrates is hitting on a
key concept of this philosophy that is also referred to in the Ion. This area of
concern will be discussed more in depth later in this thesis, but requires an
understanding of this idea, in order to understand the argument introduced in the Meno
dialogue.

15

The reference to divine dispensation ofknowledge, is surrounded by the Socratic
idea that a person can have all of one kind of knowledge, but if not attributed to
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divine knowledge, it is not contemplated or included in the Socratic search for
wisdom. But, rather referred to as true or right opinion. This is further divided
in this discussion into the idea of gaining knowledge through recognition and
recollection. This division of acquiring knowledge differs from that of true or
right opinion, because it in tum is considered to be a product of divine
dispensation.

16

Another primary question of this dialogue is whether education is a product of
recollection? In understanding this question its' essential to define recollection
and it's partner recognition. Recognition is defined in the Websters II New
College Dictionary as: I) An act of recognizing, 2) Awareness that something
perceived has been perceived before. Likewise, the definition of recollection is:
I) To recalI to one's mind or to have a memory (Pickett, 1995).

17

These two words have essentialIy the same meaning, but it is worth noting that they
include the idea of knowing or perceiving something that has been perceived before.
With before being the keyword to this discussion. The passages referring to the
questioning of a slave boy (82 - 85), do suggest that he knows something that has been
seen before. It is further argued by Meno that, the slave boy questioned in this dialogue,
could not have been exposed to the demonstrated knowledge in his present capacity.
With this declaration, Socrates answers by proposing that the boy always had the
knowledge. That his knowledge is a fragment of the soul.

m
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18

The dialogue becomes intertwined about here, but the essence seems to lay
somewhere between the idea of the immortality of the soul and divine dispensation of
knowledge. It is further suggested by Socrates that these two ideas are not separate, but
concerted.

19

Socrates passionately suggests that knowledge is a product of truth and that truth is a
product of the soul which is immortal. It is the soul that provides the ability to recollect
an opinion that later becomes knowledge when questioned. The term
soul is used throughout the dialogue as a noun, suggesting that it is tangible.

20

It seems important to note at this point in the discussion of this dialogue that the true

meaning of soul as it is used by Socrates and consequently the author, Plato,
is again unknown. Except for a few brief excerpts from the Phadeo, mainly 64c
and again in 67d, the meaning put to the term soul is obscure.

21

The lesson to be learned by this dialogue thus far, is that in order to uncover
the knowledge of reality, sophia, that is retained by the soul, whether divine or otherwise,
one must inquire about it (Pittenger, 1971). Virtue is knowledge in the largest sense of
the word and we must inquire within ourselves (the mortal & divine) to discover it.
Therefore, by continually inquiring into what we do not know we are in tum being
virtuous or maybe just acquiring aspects of virtue that are a critical part to the whole
being. This might be referred to as, "approximate knowledge," in that although we
can only approximate the essence-of what virtue is, we can make the statement that,
"though it refers to an approximation, it is nevertheless precisely true (Buck, 1970)."

~
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22

Another, important idea of this dialogue is the'question of whether the notion of,
critical inquiry is a formative educational tool or not? The term critical inquiry,
refers to the discussion of ideas. It distinguishes that there are, clear and distinct,
differences between knowledge and experience.

23

For instance, one can be read up in experiences such as, "changing a tire," but this
reading remains only knowledge until it is applied. Critical inquiry takes the
changing of a tire one step further by discussing or inquiring into the changing of
the tire. Where by, improving on that knowledge that exists.

24

Another distinguishing factor to the use of this formative educational tool is in
the difference between instruction and education. Which would therefore, dictate the
style in which critical inquiry is used. Socrates points out in this dialogue on several
occasions that these two delivery methods are not the same.

25

About the differences between instruction and education, Eugene Freeman and David
Appel, demonstrate the theory behind these terms in their book, "The Wisdom
and Ideas of Plato." On page 44, they explain these ideas as follows,
" 'Instruction' is derived from the Latin 'instruere' which means 'to build on.'
'Education' is derived from the Latin 'educare' which means 'to lead forth.'
Instruction then signifies the process whereby the instructor puts his own thoughts
into the minds of his pupils by drill and rote methods. Education on the contrary
refers to the process whereby an educator 'leads forth' from the mind of his pupil
the thoughts that his own student has created by the activity of his own thinking.
The educator then is the teacher who makes his own students think."

26

In education, not only does critical inquiry appear to be a formative tool to education and
learning, but would seem to be an essential element. This would apply both in the
inquiry and in the learning of ideas. In this sense, critical inquiry seems to give a creative
or richer edge to learning. This in it's self convey's an important lesson that, "The life
which is unexamined is not worth living (plato)."

27

In summary, Socrates seems to be making an attempt to distinguish knowledge in its pure
form, with its applied form. In which case, experience is being measured against all
other kinds of knowledge in order to judge its importance. For the most part it seems
safe to say that experience as a knowledge, is weighed very heavily in Socrates eyes.
Accordingly, experience continues to be crucial today in education and training.

28

Transitioning to the next dialogue, Jon, the same main ideas from the Meno are
again discussed. There is one difference in that the ideology of virtue is not directly in
question during this particular dialogue. Instead, the focus is on the
question if knowledge comes from divine inspiration or from good education, training
and experience combined.

Ion

29

The question of the origin of knowledge is discussed a great deal during this
dialogue, one of the more important quotes on the subject is, " ...for if the subject of
knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were
different, if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five

m
9

fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether you and I became
acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would
acknowledge that we did.. .Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no
right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art (537-538), (Jowett, 1937)."

30

This particular quotation appears to convey the lesson that all knowledge is not the same.
Meaning that there are many different aspects of knowledge. For example, there is the
knowledge of craft, the knowledge of arithmetic, and/or the knowledge of the Arts. In
addition, each of these forms of knowledge can be further broken down in to the
knowledge of sculpture, drawing, rhapsody, pottery, leather making, and so forth. Once
broken down into an area, the area can be divided into specific tasks, in which one can
have knowledge of.

31

The types of knowledge spoken of here, are different from one another, in that ifone has
knowledge of drawing they should be able to use that knowledge for use with tasks
involving the art of drawing, but not for tasks involved in the art of rhapsody. The reason
for this is the knowledge needed is not the same.

32

Another important point to knowledge is that in order to have right judgment of the
sayings and doings of that art, one must couple their knowledge with the experience of
applying that knowledge. This is most often seen in the learning of a craft, in which an
apprentice works with a master craftsmen in order to become proficient in the desired
skill.
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This principle is demonstrated in this dialogue when [on tries to argue that he is
know[edgeable as a general as well as a rbapsodists. [t is here that Socrates asks why he
is not acting as a General, since that is a more honorable profession, rather that
rhapsodizing (a notion discussed in the Republic, Book X [605c-60-7b], where Socrates
gives an argument that the Arts, Poets in particular bring out a display of emotions which
are normally considered disgraceful. Therefore, the writings of Homer, Hesiod,and the
whole lot are immoral, as a whole and seem to give Socrates as well as Greek
philosophers in general an ulcer so to speak [Rouse, 1937]). Ion replies by saying that
foreigners are not allowed to general in Athens. Socrates traps him by naming Athenian
generals who are also foreigners. Once he's won the argument, that to be a general yOll
must practice Generaling, he jokes that Ion is just trying to cheat him out of hearing
Homer, rather than say he's a General. This whole discussion tries to point out that
knowledge is not enough by itself, but must be accompanied by experience.

34

A second idea more closely related with the ideas discussed in Menu, is in reference to
the origin of knowledge. This idea distinguishes knowledge that is acquired through
experience, from knowledge that is not acquired by experience. For example, Ion states
he is unable to apply his knowledge of Homer and the art of rhapsody to any other poets
of the time, specifically to Hesoid, and Archilochus.

35

Socrates responds to Ion, by trying to convince him that his knowledge of Homer
does not derive from any skill acquired from the art of rhapsody, but from another source
altogether. He says the following to lon, " ...Ion, you are one, and are possessed by
Homer; and when anyone repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know
not what to say; but when anyone recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment,
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and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for not by art of knowledge
about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by
possession...(536), (Jowett, 1937)."

36

In this quote Socrates wants Ion to admit he is possessed through Homer. Socrates

speculates here, that God takes the mind out of poets and uses them as his servants. In
tum he thinks the same is true of the rhapsodists. Specifically, that they are chosen to
relay the word of the poets, which is really the word of God(s). Ion does agree his great
ability to speak of Homer is from divine dispensation rather than any art or science.
Unfortunately, Socrates fails to instill his lesson in Ion that experience is necessary in
order to perform the art of generaling.

Phaedrus

37

Slightly different from the ideas presented in the last dialogue, is Phaedrus. This
dialogue is much longer then the previous and the discussion significantly more
unencumbered then the rest. Useful to this thesis are the ideas relating to the arts.

38

The lessons learned from this dialogue and it's connection with education and training
are mainly focused on the actual performance of an art. Mainly, the use of the devices
associated with a specific craft from with in an art. This is illustrated with the quote, "0
most ingenious Theuth, The parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of
the utility or in-utility of his own inventions to the users of them (275), (Jowett, 1937)."
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This roughly translates to, the craftsman knows better what tools are good and useful to
him than the person who invented them. Thus, the craftsman is better qualified to judge
the use of a device. Therefore, a new device can only be justly measured when it is
judged by the users of it, rather then the inventor.

40

This is expanded upon in the following quote from the same passage, " You
who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of you own children have been led to
attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create
forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will
trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves."

41

From this excerpt we can see that the tool in question is the alphabet. Here letters are
being judged by their user (Thamus), who sees them as friends to forgetfulness rather
than creating wiseness, as was thought by their inventor, Theuth.

Theuth, believed

letters were for better memory and for the wit. He considered his invention of the
alphabet to be a useful learning tool.

42

Socrates argues the use of letters puts less use on a persons mind. He agrees with
Thamus, that using letters creates is forgetfulness. It seems that the concern here
is that people will write things down so not to forget them, but as a result they
will becomes slaves to their pen and paper.

43

A second concern here for Socrates and the like, is that letters are, "...an aid not
to not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but
only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have
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learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know
nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without
reality (Jowett, 1937). In this passage the discussion focuses on the concept of
learning being of the utmost importance to education. Like an item of clothing
education is something that accompanies us everywhere, and therefore it must be
worn with respect.

44

Another idea that emerges from this dialogue is the question of if there is an instance
when a tool can be used improperly, and what significance's accrues from it's
improper use. This relates specifically to how the art of writing should be used.
The primary question here is if words that are written should be done for the purpose
of conveying a truth or used merely for folly. This is consider in the following
passage, where Socrates says, " I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is
unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life,
and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same
maybe said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you
want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives
one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled
about anywhere among those who mayor may not understand them, and know not to
whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have
no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves (275)."

45

Socrates goes on further to say that although there is potential for words to be
defenseless, there is a far greater written word and that is word that speaks of
incontestable trues. He explains his meaning by posing the question of how a

m
14

husbandman would act, .. Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense take the seeds,
which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them
during the heat of the summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when
he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? At least he would do so, if at all, only
for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting
soil, and practices husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has
sown arrive at perfection (276)1"

46

The lessons to be learned in these passages, are that the use of words sowed in the heat
of summer; are not created in seriousness. If done this way they will not be good
works and bad works are for play. Also, important here is if a writer can not define
the truth in spoken works, how can he possibly bestow truth through the written
words. Especially, since written words can not defend themselves against ridicule.
Whence, the one who sows the words must have respect for those same words, if they
are to flourish.

47

The last idea of interest to this dialogue deals with whether the writers intent, when
writing these words, has any bearing on their use. For example, the impact of words
on the philosopher/poet verses the law giver should be different. The reason for this
is that to the lover of wisdom, words must be worked to perfection as they try to
examine and/or convey a truth. This truth if done seriously will be understood by
many people, of different cities, and different times. Poets and philosopher's works
are written both to explain and to preserve this explanation. Where as Law's are
written for the present with room for change in the future.
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Crito

48

Throughout this dialogue the ideas of ethical obligation and the obeyance of the laws, are
discussed in great detail. There is an obvious attempt to answer questions such as, should
an unjust law be obeyed? As well as, what or who determines when a law is immoral
and unfounded. Lastly and most importantly is whether one should do what he admits to
be right, or betray that right (Jowett,1937).

49

This dialogue finds Socrates in prison waiting to be executed. It begins as Socrates
awakes to see Criton sitting near him. Criton has come to try and persuade Socrates to
escape to Thessaly, to live with friends of his. This is the subject of the first quote taken
from this dialogue. Here, Socrates, explains to Criton why he doesn't wish to escape,
"Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say to us: but what he, the one man
who has understanding ofjust and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And
therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the
many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. 'Well, some one
will say, 'but the many can kill us.' ... And that is true: but still I find with surprise that
the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the
same of another proposition--that no life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued? ...a good
life is equivalent to ajust and honorable one (48), (Jowett, 1937)."

50

This passage clearly shows that Socrates does not believe escaping from prison is an
honorable or just alternative to death. He also seems to be saying that the opinion of
the masses is not to be listened to; especially, if the person strongly disagree with the
beliefs of the crowd when they recommend a deed that is unjust or dishonorable.
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Foremost, Socrates conveys that a person must do the honest and just thing of forfilling
his obligations and/or agreements. Another example is offered to stress this point, when
Socrates says to Crito, "Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought
he to betray the right?" Clearly, this question is used to establishing an argument for
doing what one believes is just.

51

Socrates, takes this question further by discussing the conditions of acting justly or
unjustly, when he says, "Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong,
or that in one way we ought and in another we ought not to do wrong, or is doing
wrong always evil and dishonorable ...or in spit of the opinion of the many, and in
spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we insist on the truth of what was
then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? ..And
what of doing evil in return for eviLFor doing evil to another is the same as injuring
him? ...Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil
we may have suffered from him ...Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent
to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding to my first
principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right
(49), (Jowett, 1937)."

52

By the clause, acting unjustly, it is assumed that this also pertains to disobeying. It is
suggested here that, Socrates, considers disobeying his sentence of death by escaping to
be dishonorable. In addition, he appears to believe escaping is the least desirable choice.
Consequently, there is the notion that upholding the truth is an honorable act,
no matter what the personal cost. "Socrates, doomed to die under trumpled up
charges, still believed that it was his duty as a citizen to respect Athenian law. He
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refused to set aside or trample on the law even at the cost of his life (Freeman, 1956)."

53

A central theme of this dialogue, and also the principle lesson, is that the act of
upholding the truth is the just and honorable thing and should always be chosen.
This principle is attested to by Socrates many times and he confirms his belief of it to
Crito when he say's, "... the old argument is unshaken as ever (Jowett, 1937)." Yet,
this principle is easily argued. Certainly, we all have heard the phrase, "An eye for an
eye," this is in direct conflict with what Socrates believes to be a principle truth.
Clearly, the taking of an eye for an eye, is an evil, a retaliation to an unjust act.
Which brings us to the classic counter argument, that two wrongs don't make a right.

54

In essence what these ideas speak about are standards. These standards in today's
society are considered to be idealist, rather that realistic. There are overtones in Crito,
that suggest these ideals were passe even then. The question of whether to follow the
crowd and leave these ideals behind, or to hang on for the sake of honor and justice,
is a difficult one. In this dialogue, Socrates, chooses to follow the decision of the state.
Here he uphold what he believes is honorable and just, by obeying the terms of his
sentence.

55

If Socrates is guilt of the crime he is accused of, then his being punished would probably
be excepted even today. However, if his sentence where unmoral or unjustified in
anyway, this punishment would clearly be consider wrong on the part ofthe state.
This poses an important question of whether or not an unjust or unethical law should
be obeyed. Socrates, argues that if a person lives in a state all of his life and never

~
18

finds disagreement with it's law or decisions, then it is unethical of that person to
suddenly find fault in the states decision just because it is not in their favor.

56

Rather than to try and disprove this theory or even to agree with it, it seems better to
just consider whether obeying the law is something that is considered an honorable
thing to do. In general it seems that it is. Therefore, obeying even an unjust law
would still be an honorable act. The result then is that honorable acts are desirable
and they are something to be upheld, even admired. The principles spoken ofhere
suggest that these are not ideas that should be discarded like yesterdays news, but
rather admired and upheld as absolute trues.

Gorgias

57

Arriving at the last dialogue, Gorgias, focuses on examining the art of rhetoric. The
scene is at the house of Callicles; Socrates, Gorgias, Chaeraphon and Polus are also
present. Socrates has come to hear Gorgias speak, but unfortunately he is to late.
Nevertheless, Gorgias agrees to answer any question put to him.

58

From here on, Socrates, begins to ask questions about the nature ofGorgias's skill. The
response is that Gorgias practices the art of rhetoric and he calls himself a rhetorician.
Socrates, is not satisfied by this answer and begins to interrogate Gorgias, and his friend
Polus, as to what distinguishes rhetoric from all the other arts. These questions are first
answered by Polus, but are not found acceptable. This leads Gorgias to respond as
follows, "Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some
sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric
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which works and takes effect only through the medi um of discourse. And therefore I am
justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse (450), (Jowett, 1937)."

59

The response that rhetoric treats discourse does not suffice Socrates, and he continues to
inquire into the nature of the art. With this Socrates begins to ask questions based on
certain trues about the art. An example of this is offered from the bottom of passage 451,
"And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric; which you would admit
(would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfill all their ends
through the medium of words?" Gorgias responds by answering, "True."
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After establishing that rhetoric is an art which deals exclusively with words, the
focus of Socrates questions shift to how those words are used. It appears that the
art of rhetoric centers on the skill of persuading others. Having the skill of

,

persuasion is said, by Gorgias, to be the same as having a power over others.
With this power a rhetoricians or an orator, (these two professions have already
been established to incorporate the same skills), has the ability to persuade the
multitudes by influencing their beliefs.
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This idea of influencing the beliefs of others, leads us to our first quote of particular
interest. Spoken by, Socrates, he asks this question of Gorgias, "Shall we than assume
two sorts of persuasion, one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other
is of knowledge...Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which
creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them? (455),
(Jowett, 1937)"
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Notable here, is the reference to rhetoric as producing a belief without any
knowledge. It appears that what a rhetorician does is to appeal to the emotions of
the crowd, jury, or whatever group of people he is speaking to. In this way he is
able to influence their beliefs long enough to elicit what he wants from them. In
which case, the rhetorician fools his audience by causing them to think they know
something to be true, when in fact they have not learned the truth, they have only
gained the belief that they know the truth. However, having the crowd believe
they know the true is powerful enough to create, in them, a confidence for the
orator. This confidence allows the orator to get his proposals adopted, regardless
of whether or not he has any skill in the art he is representing.
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Furthermore, the rhetorician is able to elicit any position he wishes because he is a
master of speech. This notion is confirmed by Gorgias, when he say's, "And I say
that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue
in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected
state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be
chosen ifhe wished... Such is the nature and power of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates,
rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody, the
rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast
or other master of fence; because he has powers which are more than a match either
for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends (456),
(Jowett, 1937)." The utility in this excerpt is clearly a question of ethics. Its
foundation lies in the idea that it is not ethical to use a skill for a purpose other than what
it was intended for. In addition, the better a body is at employing this skill, the more
unethical it is to purposely use it to deceives people.
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In digesting the ideas spoken of thus far, there appears to be certain advantages to
practicing the art of rhetoric/oration. Additionally, having the skills of oration is said,
to give power to the person who is a master of this art. This is done through the power
of speech, which allows the rhetorician to persuade others to believe in his abilities.
Power is looked upon by Callicles and Socrates as something that is evil by nature.
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The notion of power being evil is discussed in great length towards the end of this
dialogue. A sample of this is taken from the beginning of passage 526, where Socrates
gives a length response to Callicles, who has suggested that Socrates become a servant of
the state (521). Socrates response with, "The very bad men come from the class of those
who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all
admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly
is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this (Jowett,
1937)."
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From this quote, one would be led to believe that Socrates thinks the rhetorician who can
attain this power and not abuse it, should be honored. It is questionable here if he is
speaking in general, or about one of the men listening. Also, he could be said, to have
mastered the art of rhetoric. Yet, he uses his skill in a way that brings humility to the art.
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Lessons of importance in this dialogue concern the questions madc both in reference to
instilling belief without knowledge and to using a skill for less than honorable purposes.
One would hope that an art that focuses on discourse, would. also have an interest in
enlightening the masses to which it reaches. Unfortunately, history has shown that many
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great speakers, ( an extreme example is Adolph Hitler, a less threaten one is Bill
Clinton), have other than honorable intentions. For this reason, it seems ortbe utmost
importance that individuals using this forum, be instructed on it use, and its limitations.
The misuse of this ability to persuade other can cause a tremendous amount of harm. As
a result it seem appropriate to teach not a belief of conviction to do good, but the
knowledge of what is good, and what is ethical. Additionally, this must be begun early
with decency and high moral standards.

Conclusion
68

The basis of this thesis was to find an-ideology of what good education is, by examining
excerpt's from Plato's dialogues, Meno, Ion, Gorgias, Crito, and Phaedrus. This has
been done by explaining this ideology in terms oflessons learned for application to,
education. The remains of this thesis will be dedicated to summarizing the lessons
learned from each of the dialogues:

1.

Meno - There are clear and distinct differences between knowledge and
experience. Experience is-a necessary factor in learning.

2.

Ion

- The subject of knowledge is different depending on the art in
question.
- In order to have right judgment of the sayings and doings of an

art, one must couple their knowledge with the experience of
applying the knowledge.
- There is no substitute for experience.
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3.

Phaedrus - A device can only be justly measured when it is judged by the
users of it, rather then the inventor.
- Education should be something that is highly respected for it's
usefulness.

- Before writing words down, the author must be able to define
the truth of these word as they are spoken.

- Written words should not replace the spoken word, but should
be used to preserve an absolute truth.

4.

Crito - Honorable acts are to be both desired and admired.

- A man should do what he admits to be right.

S.

Gorgias - There are two types of persuasion the one that creates
knowledge by learning and the one that only creates a belief
without knowledge.

- It is not ethical to use a skill for a purpose other that what it was

intended for if it deceives people, no matter how good a person
is at the skill.
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